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Why Reforms Alone Are Insufficient
to Strengthen the Judiciary: A Case
Study of Guatemala's Judicial
Selection Processes
BY MIRTE POSTEMA*
As the Cold War was coming to an end, Central American
countries emerged from decades-long armed conflicts by signing
peace agreements and initiating transitions to civilian rule.' The
imperative of strengthening democratic institutions spurred the
disbursement of over 200 million dollars for judicial reform
projects,2 which mostly focused on creating new infrastructure and
*Mirte Postema is Fellow for Human Rights, Criminal Justice and Prison Reform in the
Americas at the Stanford Human Rights Center, Stanford Law School. Prior to that, she was
Senior Program Officer of the Judicial Independence Program at the Due Process of Law
Foundation (DPLF), an NGO focused on the promotion of human rights and the rule of law
in Latin America. The author would like to thank Professors James L. Cavallaro, Naomi
Roht-Arriaza and J. Ram6n Gonzilez Ponciano, as well as Michel Andrade, for their
comments on earlier drafts of the article. The views expressed in this article are solely those
of the author. E-mail: mpostema@law.stanford.edu; Twitter: @MirtePostema.
1. The Esquipulas Agreements, the first of which (Declaraci6n de Esquipulas) was
signed on May 5, 1986, and the second (Declaraci6n de Esquipulas II) on August 7, 1987,
established Central American presidents' commitment to end the armed conflicts in the
region and establish a "stable and lasting peace" ("paz firme y duradera"). Each country
followed its own process. In Guatemala, the war was ended by a series of peace agreements,
the last one of which (Acuerdo sobre el cronograma para la implementaci6n, cumplimiento y
verficaci6n de los acuerdos de paz [Agreement about the timeframe for the implementation,
observance and verification of the peace agreements]) was signed on December 29, 1996.
2. Between 1992 and 2011, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) financed justice reform projects in Central America for US$229,541,646. The
vast majority of these projects were loans. These numbers do not account for projects
executed with funds from international cooperation agencies, like the U.S. Agency for
International Development. Luis PASARA, INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR JUSTICE REFORM IN
LATIN AMERICA: WORTHWHILE OR WORTHLESS? 3, 4 (2012).
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laws.3 However, the initial promise of democracy has been substituted
for a general sense of despair: despite these considerable investments,
no clear progress has been made in strengthening the judiciary' and
public confidence in judicial institutions remains extremely low.5
Guatemala is a stark example. Loans from financial institutions
alone amounted to the spending of over 60 million dollars on judicial
reform projects in the last decades. 6 Nevertheless, public trust in the
country's judicial institutions has only declined: in 2013, a combined
total of 71.2% of Guatemalans indicated to have little to no
confidence in the judiciary, compared with 56.3% in 1997.7
Although the initiatives undertaken have shown some positive results
- specialized laws8 and courts9 were created, and more recently, a
United Nations-backed ("UN") commission and the Public Ministry
conducted important investigations into organized crime and
corruption" - it is important to note that the judiciary's structural
3. See Pdsara, supra note 2; LINN HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING REFORM: IMPROVING
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN LATIN AMERICA (2007).
4. Id.
5. In the public opinion polls conducted by Latinobar6metro in 2013, a combined total
of 79.2% of Central Americans (counting inhabitants of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama; data about Belize was not available) indicated that they
had little to no trust in the judiciary. Andlisis Online [Online Analysis], LATINOBAROMETRO,
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnlinejsp (select countries, year, "Confianza en las
instituciones nacionales" [Trust in national institutions], "Grado de conflanza en instituciones-
personas: El poder judicial" [Level of trust in institutions-persons: the judiciary]) (last visited
Sept. 14, 2015).
6. Between 1992 and 2011, the World Bank and the IDB financed justice reform
projects in Guatemala for US$63,627,000: the largest amount of all Central American
countries. If projects financed by international cooperation agencies would be taken into
account, this number would be even higher. Pdsara, supra note 2, at 3.
7. Andlisis Online [Online Analysis], LATINOBAR6METRO, http://www.latinobaro
metro.org/latOnline.jsp (select "Guatemala," year, "Confianza en las instituciones nacionales"
[Trust in national institutions], "Grado de conflanza en instituciones-personas: El poder
judicial" [Level of trust in institutions-persons: the judiciary]) (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
8. For instance, the law that regulates the selection processes for judicial authorities.
Ley de Comisiones de Postulacidn [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto 19-2009
[Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009 (Guat.).
9. For instance, the specialized courts for violence against women. see MINISTERIO
PJBLICO DE GUATEMALA [PUBLIC MINISTRY OF GUATEMALA], Inauguran Juzgado de Turno
de Primera Instancia Penal de Delitos de Femicidio [Inauguration of Criminal Court of
First Instance for Crimes of Femicide], Nov. 23, 2012, https://www.mp.gob.gt/2012/11/23
/inauguran-juzgado-de-tumo-de-primera-instancia-penal-de-delitos-de-femicidio/. (last visited
Sept. 14, 2015).
10. See Azam Ahmed, Guatemala's Corruption Investigations Make Swift Strides, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/world/americas/guatemalas-
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problems remain largely unaddressed. Consequently, notwithstanding
the implementation of certain judicial reforms, powerful forces such
as political actors, the business community, and criminal
organizations continue to exercise their influence over the courts.
Guatemala's selection processes for judicial authorities is a striking
example of this unfortunate reality.
This Article draws upon the author's work as an observer and
civil society actor in Guatemala's 2014 judicial selection processes.I
It first provides a characterization of Guatemala's recent history, after
which it summarizes the normative framework that regulated the
selection processes. It then continues to discuss the intricacies of how
the selection bodies, despite formally complying with applicable laws,
manipulated these processes. This Article concludes that,
notwithstanding the implementation of judicial reforms that created
detailed norms for a transparent and merit-based selection, powerful
actors have managed to manipulate Guatemala's judicial selection
processes and counted on the endorsement of judicial and political
actors for doing so. This disregard for legality has serious
consequences for the rule of law.
A number of lessons might be drawn from Guatemala's
experience that could be relevant to other countries - in particular,
those emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, and where the
effective power of de facto actors could constitute an obstacle to
implementing effective reforms. One is that where powerful
entrenched interests interfere with the adequate functioning of public
institutions, reforms are not likely to be successful if such
manipulations remain unaddressed. Secondly, in such contexts,
isolated reforms (i.e., those only focusing on the judiciary rather than
on the system of governance of a whole) will likely be insufficient to
effect meaningful changes in practice. Nevertheless, thirdly, the
recent successes of the International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG) in investigating and disbanding parallel powers
in the country suggest that a further examination of CICIG's
experience is advisable to explore whether the establishment of such
an internationally supported entity should be recommended as a first
step to countries facing similar challenges.
corruption-investigations-make-swift-strides.html (last visited Sep. 14, 2015).
11. For an overview of this work, see DuE PROCESS OF LAW FOUNDATION, DPLF's
Work in the Judicial Selection Processes in Guatemala, http://www.dplf.org/en/news/dplfs-
work-judicial-selection-process-guatemala (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
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I. Guatemala: Social Exclusion, Conflict, Parallel Powers
Guatemala is located in Central America, bordered by Mexico,
Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador, and has some 15 million
inhabitants. The country faces considerable challenges: almost 30%
of Guatemala's population lives on $2 USD a day or less, 1 2 71% of
its rural population lives in conditions of poverty," and income
distribution is very unequal.1 4 In addition to this, the UN Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicated that drug trafficking routes
increasingly go through Guatemala's border regions,15 and the 2013
Global Study on Homicide reported that there were 6,025 intentional
homicides in the country that year, for a count of 39.9 per 100,000
inhabitants.1 6 This is extremely high: The global average was 6.2,17
Iraq had 8, Mexico had 21.5, and the Netherlands had 0.9 intentional
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.1 8
These kinds of problems are not new for the country. In 1996,
Guatemala emerged from a thirty-six year long armed conflict that,
according to the UN-sponsored truth commission for Guatemala, the
Commission for Historical Clarification (Comisi6n para el
Esclarecimiento Hist6rico, CEH), had its origins in the "profound
exclusion, antagonism and conflict" 9 that characterized Guatemala's
"economic, social, and cultural relations (... .)-a reflection of its
colonial history."2 0 The conflict had been fueled by the Cold War21
12. World Bank, Poverty headcount at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population), http://data.w
orld bank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY/countries (last visited Sep. 14, 2015).
13. World Bank, Rural poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of rural
population), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.RUHC/countries (last visited Sept.
14,2015).
14. World Bank numbers from 2011 estimated Guatemala's Gini index to be 52.4. See
World Bank, GINI index (World Bank estimate), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV
.GINI (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
15. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (UNODC), TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A THREAT ASSESSMENT
(2012).
16. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (UNODC), GLOBAL STUDY ON
HOMICIDE 2013 (2014) 126, https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_
HOMICIDEBOOKweb.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
17. Id. at 12.
18. Id. at 122-32.
19. COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION (CEH), GUATEMALA. MEMORY OF
SILENCE. TZ'INIL NA'TA'BAL. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1999), concl. 3.
20. Id.
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and led to the deaths of over 200,000 people, 22 83% of whom were
Mayan indigenous peoples.23 The CEH concluded that 93% of all
acts of violence could be attributed to agents of the State, while
guerrilla groups were responsible for some 3%.24 Moreover, the CEH
reached the conclusion that genocide had been committed25 and that
the judicial system had tolerated-and in some cases facilitated -
acts of violence.26 The judiciary had denied habeas corpus,
consistently interpreted the law in favor of the country's authorities,
demonstrated indifference to the torture of detainees, and restricted
the right to defense.27 It had contributed to creating "a climate of
terror." 2 8
When discussing contemporary Guatemala, it is important to be
mindful of another element to this already complex scenario: the
presence of "illegal clandestine security apparatuses" (cuerpos
ilegales y aparatos clandestinos de seguridad, CIACS).29 CIACS
mostly originated in State intelligence agencies that were involved in
counter-insurgency efforts during the armed conflict, such as the
Presidential Guard (Estado Mayor Presidencial, EMP), as well as in
the then-present paramilitary forces.30 The intelligence agencies were
so powerful - in part, because of their strong links to other important
actors in Guatemalan society3 1 - that a special section in the Peace
Accords established the necessity of their restructuring and
21. Id., concl. 13, 14, 18.
22. Id., concl. 2.
23. Id. at 85.
24. COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, Id. concl. 128.
25. Id., concl. 108-123.
26. Id., concl. 10.
27. Id., concl. 95.
28. Id., concl. 56.
29. See generally LuIs JORGE GARAY SALAMANCA ET AL., NARCOTRAFICO, CORRUPCION
Y ESTADOS. COMO LAS REDES ILICITAS HAN RECONFIGURADO LAS INSTITUCIONES EN
COLOMBIA, GUATEMALA Y MtXICO [DRUG TRAFFICKING, CORRUPTION AND STATES. How
ILLEGAL NETWORKS HAVE RECONFIGURED THE INSTITUTIONS IN COLOMBIA, GUATEMALA AND
MEXICo] (2012).
30. See SUSAN C. PEACOCK & ADRIANA BELTRAN, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN
AMERICA (WOLA), HIDDEN POWERS: ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS IN POST-CONFLICT
GUATEMALA AND THE FORCES BEHIND THEM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2003), http://www.
wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Citizen%20Security/past/HiddenPowers%20%20
Exec.%20Summary.pdf. Also see CIACS, InSight Crime, http://www.insightcrime.org/gu
atemala-organized-crime-news/ciacs (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
31. Peacock & Beltrdn, supra note 30, at 4.
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regulation.32 However, as the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala
(MINUGUA), established to monitor the implementation of the
Peace Accords, observed in 2002:
Commitments in the peace agreements that would give
the State mechanisms to control [CIACS], such as
strengthening police and judicial investigative capacities,
civilian intelligence and congressional controls over
intelligence agencies, have not been implemented.
Shielded by impunity, these structures have regrouped
and are pursuing illegal business interests and political
influence. With the State no longer committing human
rights abuses as a matter of policy, these groups'
relations to the Government apparatus are diffuse,
although they still hold some key positions and maintain
informal links to police, justice officials and military
intelligence.3 3
It is important to note that the peace agreements, which were
meant to address the structural issues that led to the conflict34 and
included a number of reforms to strengthen the judiciary,35 were
never fully implemented.36 Even though several important new laws
32. AcuERDo SOBRE FORTALECIMIENTO DEL PODER CIVIL Y FUNCION DEL EJtRCITO EN UNA
SOCIEDAD DEMOCRATICA [AGREEMENT ON THE STRENGTHENING OF CIVIIAN POWER AND ROLE
OF THE ARMED FORCES IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY] (Sept. 19, 1996), arts. 46-54, http://www.g
uatemalaun.org/bin/documents/Acuerdo%20fortalecimiento%20poder/20civil%20y%2Ofu
nci%C3%B3n%20del%20ej%C3%A9rcito.pdf, translated in United Institute for Peace,
Peace Agreements General Collection (Nov. 20, 1998), http://www.usip.org/sit es/default/fil
es/ file/resources/collections/peace-agreements/guatL960919.pdf [hereinafter Agreement
on the Strengthening of Civilian Power].
33. U.N. General Assembly, Thirteenth Report on Human Rights of the United Nations
Verification Mission in Guatemala, A/57/336 (Aug. 22 2002), at para. 52 [hereinafter
MINUGUA Thirteenth Report]. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN
GUATEMALA (CICIG), TERCER AI4O DE LABORES: RESUMEN EJECUTIVO 3 (2010), http://www
.cicig.org/uploads/documents/informes/INFOR-LABODOCO6_20100901_ES.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2015).
34. See LuIs PASARA, PAZ, ILUSION Y CAMBIO EN GUATEMALA: EL PROCESO DE PAZ, SUS
ACTORES, LOGROS Y LIMITES [PEACE, HOPE AND CHANGE IN GUATEMALA: THE PEACE
PROCESS, ITS ACTORS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITS] 16-18 (2003).
35. AGREEMENT ON THE STRENGTHENING OF CIVILIAN POWER, supra note 32, arts. 8-17.
36. See MINUGUA Thirteenth Report, supra note 33, at para 52; U.N General
Assembly, United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, A/59/746 (2004). See also
Pdsara, supra note 34.
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were adopted,37 no real advances were made in addressing the
structural problems affecting the country's judicial institutions. The
expert Thomas Carothers may provide a possible explanation:
"[w]hat [those implementing reforms] tend not to ask is why the
judiciary is in a lamentable state, whose interests its weakness serves,
and whose interests may temporarily be threatened or bolstered by
reforms. The assistance may temporarily alleviate some of the
symptoms, but the underlying systemic pathologies remain." 38
As a result, the impact of judicial reforms has been limited, and
Carothers' 1999 observation remains valid. Most of the entrenched
social and political problems that have marked life for decades are
still very much with Guatemalans: a tremendously skewed
distribution of wealth in favor of a small, self-protective business
class; an indigenous majority that is profoundly marginalized;
widespread poverty; incoherent, shifting political parties; a weak
civil society; and powerful security forces reluctant to submit to
political authority.3
The practical consequences of this reality become clear when we
examine Guatemala's judicial selection processes in more detail.
Even though norms have been created that provide the elements
necessary to conduct transparent and merit-based selection processes,
the influence of powerful actors such as political forces, the business
community, and CIACS in the selection bodies has meant that
although these rules are complied with formally, they are not
respected in practice.
II. Judicial Selection Processes in Guatemala
The judiciary is essential for the functioning of any modem,
democratic society. It upholds the rule of law and is a check on other
State powers. 40 The quality of the administration of justice is
determined, to an important extent, by the capacity of its individual
37. For example, the Ley Marco del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad [Framework Law
for the National System of Security] (Mar. 11, 2008) (Guat.).
38. THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD. THE LEARNING CURVE 101
(Washington 1999).
39. Id. at 75.
40. See generally SHIMON SHETREET ET AL., THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE.
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES (Nijhoff Publishers 2012).
2016] 243
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members. This means that the existence of judicial selection
processes aimed at finding those who are most qualified is essential
to building a strong, independent judiciary.41 This is even more
relevant when judicial authorities are selected, especially where
magistrates have considerable administrative powers in addition to
their judicial ones and are thus able to influence lower judges'
careers, as is common in Latin America. 42
Despite the importance of solid selection processes of judicial
authorities, detailed regulation of these processes is often lacking. As
a result, appointing authorities have extremely broad discretionary
powers and tend to base their decisions on criteria of political
convenience rather than on the merits of the candidates. 43 Guatemala
is an interesting case: unlike many other countries, it does have a
detailed law that provides the necessary elements for transparent and
merit-based judicial selection processes, but an examination of these
processes reveals that this sophistication has not stopped the
interference of powerful actors.
Both lawful actors, such as the government and the business
community, and illicit entities, like CIACS, have a strong interest in
controlling the judiciary. In the first place, the judiciary is crucial to
protecting and legitimizing these actors' current activities and
interests.44 Secondly, apart from CIACS, a number of key actors in
the political and business community had their origins in the armed
41. See INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GUARANTEES FOR THE
INDEPENDENCE OF JUSTICE OPERATORS: TOWARDS STRENGTHENING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AMERICAS (2013) OEA/SER.L/V/II.Doc.44, 56. See also DUE
PROCESS OF LAW FOUNDATION, GUIDELINES FOR A TRANSPARENT AND MERIT-BASED SYSTEM
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF HIGH-LEVEL JUDGES (2014), http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/fil
es/guidelines-selection of highlevel-judges.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
42. See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, A/HRC/23/43/Add.4, ¶ 79; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 41, at ¶ 57. For an overview of judicial
selection and appointment processes in Latin America, see Luis Pisara & Marco Feoli,
Prevalece la selecci6n politica en nombramientos judiciales en Am6rica Latina [Political
selection prevails in judicial appointments in Latin America] (2013) http://dplf.org/sites
/default/files/pasara-y-feoli-prevalece la seleccion-politica.pdf (last visited Sept. 14,
2015).
43. See INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at ¶ 57;
Pdsara & Feoli, supra note 42.
44. See Martin Rodriguez Pellecer, Andres Zepeda & Rodrigo V61iz, Las 5 claves para
entender la disputa por la justicia [The 5 keys to understanding the fight over the justice
sector], N6MADA (Apr. 22, 2014) https://nomada.gt/las-claves-para-entender-la-disputa-por-
la-justicia-2/.
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conflict and had (and often continue to have) ties to the armed
forces. 45 Some of these might want to ensure impunity for crimes of
the past, for which controlling the judiciary is essential.
This means that in 2014, when a number of crucial actors in the
Guatemalan justice system were to be appointed, much was at stake.
Between February and May of 2014, a process was implemented to
appoint a new Attorney General to a four-year term. Between July
and November of 2014, the selection processes for the thirteen
justices of the Supreme Court and for the 128 judges of the country's
Court of Appeals took place concurrently, albeit in different selection
commissions. 46 These judges would be appointed to five-year
terms.47
A. The Normative Framework: Ley de Comisiones de Postulacidn
(Nominating Commissions Law)
In an attempt to depoliticize the judicial selection processes, 4 8
Guatemala selects its Attorney General, Supreme Court, and Court of
Appeals by means of Comisiones de Postulacidn (Nominating
Commissions, "CdPs").49 Other authorities, with the exception of the
45. See Martin Rodriguez Pellecer, Los militares y la blite, la alianza que gan6 la
guerra [The military and the elite, the alliance that won the war], PLAZA PYBLICA (Aug. 21,
2013), http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/los-militares-y-la-elite-la-alianza-que-gano-
la-guerra.
46. See Mirte Postema, 2014, ahio clave para lajusticia en Guatemala [2014, a crucial
year for justice in Guatemala], DPLFBLOG JUSTICIA EN LAS AMtRICAS (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://dplfblog.com/2014/03/19/2014-ano-clave-para-la-justicia-en-guatemala/; Mirte Postema,
Righting Guatemala's Broken Judicial Selection Process, AMERICAS QUARTERLY BLOG (Oct.
16, 2014), http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/righting-guatemalas-broken-judicial-sele
ction-process [hereinafter: Postema, Guatemala's Judicial Selection].
47. It is important to note that such short periods of tenure are problematic for judicial
independence per se, because they do not sufficiently guarantee job stability. See Leandro
Despouy, (Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers), Report,
A/HRC/1 1/41 (March 24, 2009), at ¶ 54; IACHR INDEPENDENCE OF JUSTICE OPERATORS,
supra note 41, at ¶¶ 83, 84.
48. Acuerdo Legislativo Mimero 18-93 [Legislative Agreement Number 18-93]
(November 17, 1993) (Guat.); Ley de Comisiones de Postulaci6n, Decreto 19-2009 [Law on
Nominating Commissions, Decree No. 19-2009] (June 2, 2009) (Guat.). Before, the Attorney
General was directly appointed by the President, and judges were appointed by Congress.
CONSTITUClON POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA], Sept. 15, 1965, arts. 221, 242, 253. (Guat.).
49. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE GUATEMALA [POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA] May 31, 1985 (amended Nov. 17, 1993),
arts. 215, 217, 251 (Guat.); Ley de Comisiones de Postulacidn [Nominating Commissions
2016] 245
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Constitutional Court,"o are selected by mechanisms similar to CdPs, to
which the principles enshrined in the Nominating Commissions Law
(LCP) also apply. 1
CdPs are ad hoc bodies that are mandated by the Constitution to
establish a shortlist of candidates from which Congress - or, in the
case of the Attorney General, the President - then makes the
appointments from this list.5 2 The deans of the country's law schools
form the core of CdPs. 53 When judges are selected, other members of
the legal community, like representatives of the bar association and
of judges, also take part in CdPs. 54
Law], Decreto 19-2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009 (Guat.). See also MiCHEL ANDRADE,
IMPUNITY WATCH, NOMINATING COMMISSIONS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN GUATEMALA
(2014), available at http://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/PBComisiones-version-ingles
.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
50. The Presidency, Congress, Supreme Court, San Carlos University (the national
public university) and the business community directly appoint one judge each to the
Constitutional Court. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REP0BLICA DE GUATEMALA [POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA] May 31, 1985 (amended Nov. 17, 1993),
art. 269 (Guat.).
51. The Procurador de los Derechos Humanos [Human Rights Ombudsman] (PDH)
and the Director of the Instituto de la Defensa Pblica Penal [Public Defender's Office]
(IDPP), for instance, are elected by Congress, but the shortlist for the PDH is established by
a Congressional Commission (CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA
[POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA] May 31, 1985 (amended Nov.
17, 1993), art. 273 (Guat.), and the shortlist for the Director of the IDPP is drawn up by the
IDPP Council (Ley del Servicio Ptiblico de la Defensa Pliblica Penal [Law on the Public
Service of the Public Defender's Office], Decreto 129-97 [Decree 129-97], Dec. 5, 1997,
arts. 10, 23 (Guat.). These selection bodies are obliged to apply the principles enshrined in
the LCP (Ley de Comisiones de Postulaci6n [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto 19-
2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009 (Guat.), art. 1).
52. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REP(JBLICA DE GUATEMALA [POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA] May 31, 1985 (amended Nov. 17, 1993),
arts 215, 217, 251 (Guat.).
53. This was not the first time for Academia to have an important say in the justice
system. During the dictatorship of General Rios Montt (1982-1983), "the Constitution was
suspended and the magistrates of the Supreme Court were replaced by the deans of private
universities," Rachel Sieder & Patrick Costello, Judicial Reform in Central America:
Prospects for the Rule of Law, in Rachel Sieder (ed.), CENTRAL AMERICA: FRAGILE
TRANSITION 195 (1996).
54. The CdP for the Attorney General consists of Guatemala's (currently 11) law school
deans, the president of the Guatemalan bar association (Colegio de Abogados y Notarios de
Guatemala, CANG), the president of the bar association's disciplinary body (Tribunal de
Honor), and the president of the Supreme Court, who presides the CdP. The CdPs for the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals are much larger with a total of 34 members: the 11
law school deans, and equal numbers of representatives of the bar association and of judges,
elected by their peers. In the CdP for the Supreme Court, representatives of Court of
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In 2009, following significant UN and civil society
involvement," a relatively detailed legal framework for the operation
of these commissions was adopted: the Ley de Comisiones de
Postulacidn (Nominating Commissions Law, "LCP").56 The
Guatemalan Constitution establishes that all public offices are
awarded on the basis of capacity, aptitude, and honesty, 7 and that
judges need to be "of recognized honorability" (de reconocida
honorabilidad)."
The LCP's most important features are that prior to each
selection process, CdPs are obliged to establish a profile and a grading
table according to which candidates' ethical, academic, professional,
and personal qualities ("proyecci6n humana"), like vocation and
leadership, are evaluated.59 CdPs are required to verify applicants'
qualifications60 and can decide to interview them.6 1 The public can
submit observations if it considers certain candidates to be
unqualified.62 Moreover, all CdP meetings and evaluations are
Appeals judges participate, and when Court of Appeals judges are selected, the
representatives of judges are Supreme Court justices. These commissions are presided by a
university rector, also elected by his or her peers. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPJBLICA
DE GUATEMALA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA] May 31, 1985
(amended Nov. 17, 1993), arts. 215, 217 (Guat.).
55. See Leandro Despouy (Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers), Report, Addendum, Mission to Guatemala (Oct. 1, 2009) A/HRC/11/41/Add.3;
Helen Mack, Desaflos y retos de las Comisiones de Postulaci6n (Antecedentes de la Ley de
Comisiones de Postulaci6n) [Challenges and threats for Nominating Commissions (History
of the Law on Nominating Commissions)], text of presentation at Foro sobre Ley de
Comisiones de Postulaci6n [Forum about Nominating Commissions Law], June 2009,
available at http://eleccionmagistrados.guatemalavisible.org/index.php/informacion/39 (last
visited Sept. 14, 2015).
56. Ley de Comisiones de Postulacidn [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto 19-
2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009, art. 2 (Guat.).
57. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPJBLICA DE GUATEMALA [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA] May 31, 1985 (amended Nov. 17, 1993), art. 113 (Guat.).
58. Id. art. 207.
59. Ley de Comisiones de Postulaci6n [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto 19-
2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009, art. 12 (Guat.).
60. Id. art. 18.
61. Id. art. 19.
62. Id. art. 20. See Comisi6n de Postulaci6n para Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia [CdP for Supreme Court Justices], Criterios para la evaluaci6n de impedimentos
contra los aspirantes a Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [Criteria for the
evaluation of impediments against applicants to the Supreme Court], http://guatemalavisible
.net/index.php?option=com k2&view-item&task-download&id=362_6eaec4bfdb7752e5e2
880a9f6587747d&Itemid=124. For a list of the challenges filed by the public against
candidates for the Court of Appeals, see Comisi6n de Postulaci6n de la Corte de Apelaciones y
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public. The meetings are recorded in audio and video format, the
resulting documents remain accessible, 63 and each CdP is required to
"opportunely inform" the public of its actions. 64
The Corte de Constitucionalidad (Constitutional Court, "CC")
further bolstered the standards applicable to the judicial selection
processes. In 2010, it determined that CdPs could not limit
themselves to grading basic competencies, but that they are required
to analyze and discuss the qualifications of applicants.6 5
Furthermore, although CdPs should not award a grade for
honorability (reconocida honorabilidad), they are required to
evaluate whether a candidate is deemed honorable. 66 Lastly, in a
decision directly concerning the 2014 selection processes, the CC
obligated CdPs to expressly establish whether a candidate fit the
previously established profile, to conduct interviews to evaluate the
extent of his or her abilities, and to indicate the reasons why a person
ultimately was, or was not, included on a CdP's shortlist.67
One might think that with such a framework, transparent and
merit-based selection processes would be guaranteed. There are
autonomous selection commissions composed of legal scholars and
practitioners who evaluate candidates' qualifications following a
clearly established, transparent process. However, a closer look at
how these commissions have functioned proves otherwise.
otros Tribunales Colegiados de igual categoria [CdP for the Court of Appeals and other
Collegiate Tribunals of equal hierarchy], Listado de postulantes que se les notific6 denuncias
y/o seilalamientos [List of applicants who were notified of complaints and/or observations],
http://guatemalavisible.net/index.php?option=comk2&view-item&task-
download&id=417_3276a 78fa4e3133bc3df298276 8042a 4&It emid=124.
63. Ley de Comisiones de Postulaci6n [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto 19-
2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009 (Guat.), art. 9.
64. Id. at art. 2.
65. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], June 10, 2010, Expedientes
acumulados Ndmeros 1477, 1478, 1488, 1602 and 1630-2010 [Joint files Numbers 1477,
1478, 1488, 1602 and 1630-2010] at 7 (Guat.).
66. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Aug. 24, 2010, Expediente
Niumero 942-2010 [File Number 942-2010] (Guat.).
67. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], June 13, 2014, Expediente
Nilmero 2143-2014 [File Number 2143-2014] (Guat.). See also Mirte Postema, Constitutional
Court of Guatemala strengthens judicial selection rules, DPLFBLOG JUSTICIA EN LAS
AMtRICAS (July 7, 2014), https://dplfblog.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/blog-post-cc-2143-
2014-english.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
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B. Problems in Practice: Infiltration by Powerful Actors Leads to
Disregard for Legality
There are a number of issues with the normative framework that
affect the workability of the CdP model. For example, the excessive
size of the CdPs for the selection of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals judges, and the fact that there is no necessary relation
between the grade a candidate receives and his or her inclusion on
the shortlist. As a result, commissioners can simply vote for those
with the lowest, instead of the highest, qualifications. Another
problem is that only the legal sector participates in the selection of
judicial authorities. This restricts the process to a small, closed
community, which results in uncritical assessments and influence
peddling. Additionally, the requirement that all CdP meetings are
public may be ineffective: Issues of importance tend to be debated in
substance during the frequent recesses that CdPs take, rather than
during the public meetings. However, although these issues should
be remedied, those that most undermine the effectiveness of the
selection processes are of a practical nature.
The essence of the problem is that the creation of a normative
framework, however solid and transparent it might be, does not
automatically lead to a change in practice. This is especially true when
powerful actors might see their interests threatened.68 Indeed, the
experience of Guatemala's CdPs demonstrates that it is possible for
selecting authorities to provide a veneer of legality to such processes
by complying formally with the law, while disregarding its purpose. In
the 2014 judicial selection processes, there were a number of factors
that contributed to this manipulation. Some factors include the
permeability of the commissions, the abuse of the margins of
discretion in the LCP, the endorsement of these practices by judicial
and political authorities, and the lack of significant social or political
consequences to these violations. As a result, different powerful actors
such as political parties, the business community, and organized crime
managed to achieve influence in the selection processes.
68. See generally GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, COUNTERPOINTS: SELECTED ESSAYS ON
AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION 180-82 (1999); see also GUILLERMO
O'DONNELL, DISSONANCES: DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUES OF DEMOCRACY 119 (2007).
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1. Permeability of CdPs
The problems with Guatemala's judicial selection processes start
with the composition of CdPs. Although these commissions were
established to ensure objective selection processes,6 9 the influence of
third party actors has distorted their purpose.7 0 The interference in
the appointments of deans of law schools has been an important
vehicle for this.
Given that the Constitution does not establish a finite number of
authorities or law schools that have seats on CdPs, the creation of a
new law school means that an additional dean will be added to each
Commission. Moreover, since the number of deans is directly related
to the number of representatives of both the bar association and
judges that participate in CdPs,7 1 the creation of one law school
creates not just one, but three possibilities for influence - and
unfortunately, the bar association 7 2 and the judiciary73 have shown to
be permeable actors. 7 4 As a consequence, far-fetched as it may seem
69. See Ley de Comisiones de Postulaci6n [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto
19-2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009 (Guat.), preamble.
70. See Stephen Dudley, Justice and the Creation of a Mafia State in Guatemala, INSIGHT
CRIME (Sept. 15, 2014) http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/justice-and-the-creation-of-
a-mafia-state-in-guatemala; Postema, Guatemala's Judicial Selection, supra note 46.
71. See footnote 51.
72. See MOVIMIENTO PRO JUSTICIA, CONFORMACI6N DE LAS COMISIONES DE POSTULACION
PARA MAGISTRADOS DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA Y CORTE DE APELACIONES 2014-2019.
ELECCI6N DE REPRESENTANTES DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS Y NOTARIOS DE GUATEMALA
(CANG) [CONFIGURATION OF NOMINATING COMMISSIONS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES 2014-2019. ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GUATEMALAN
ASSOCIATION OF LAWYERS AND NOTARIES (CANG)] 1, 6 (2014), http://www.movimient
oprojusticia.org.gt/images/archivos%202014/otros/ElecciC3%B3n%20de%20representant
es%20CANG%202014.pdf (last visited Sep. 14, 2015).
73. MOVIMIENTO PRO JUSTICIA, CONFORMACION DE LAS COMISIONES DE POSTULACI6N
PARA MAGISTRADOS DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA 2014-2019. ELECCION DE LOS
REPRESENTANTES DE LA CORTE DE APELACIONES [CONFIGURATION OF NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 2014-2019. ELECTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS] 3, 4 (2014),http://www.movimientoprojusticia.org.gt/im ages
/archivos%202014/otros/ElecciC3%B3n%20de%20representantes%20CA%202014.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2015).
74. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA (CICIG), TERCER
AlO DE LABORES: RESUMEN EJECUTIVO [THIRD YEAR OF WORK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY] 3
(2010), http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/informes/INFOR-LABODOCO6_201009
01 _ES .pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). See also Stephen Dudley, The 'Tennis Shoe King'
Who Became Guatemala's Gentleman Lobbyist, INSIGHT CRIME (2014), http://www.insig
htcrime.org/investigations/guatemala-lopez-villatoro-corruption-lobbyist (last visited Sept.
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for the amount of work and monetary investment involved, the last
two decades have seen a proliferation of law schools in Guatemala."
When the mechanism of CdPs was established by the 1993
constitutional reforms, there were four law schools in the country.76
In 2004, there were seven, in 2009, there were nine,77 and in 2014,
Guatemala had eleven law schools. Even though some of these do
not have an academic track record - one had not enrolled any
students, and three of these had not graduated any students yet" -
kthe deans of these law schools did participate in the CdPs. Initially,
with four law schools, a CdP would be composed of thirteen
members (four deans, four bar association representatives, four
judges and a presiding university president). However, the 2014
CdPs for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals numbered
thirty-four members. 79 Aided by this expansion of membership,
powerful actors such as political forces, the business community, and
CIACS have been able to yield significant influence in Guatemala's
judicial selection processes.
2. Abuse ofMargin ofDiscretion in Norms
During a selection process, there are two ways in which one can
favor certain candidates while staying within the formal margins of
the law, i.e., by designing the mechanism with which candidates will
be evaluated, and by influencing how this instrument is applied. Such
interferences will appear less obvious if executed well, making these
14, 2015).
75. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA (CICIG), INFORME:
PROCESO DE ELECCI6N DE MAGISTRADOS A LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA Y CORTES DE
APELACIONES Y OTROS TRIBUNALES COLEGIADOS DE IGUAL CATEGORIA ANiO 2009, [REPORT:
SELECTION PROCESS FOR JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE AND COURTS OF
APPEALS AND OTHER COLLEGIATE TRIBUNALS OF EQUAL HIERARCHY IN 2009] 65 (2009),
http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/informes/INFOR-TEMADOCO2_20091101_ES.
pdf [hereinafter CICIG 2009] (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
76. Oswaldo J. HernAndez, El pals de los abogados [The country of lawyers], PLAZA
POBLICA, Sep. 8, 2014, http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/contentlel-pais-de-los-abogados (last
visited Sep. 14, 2015).
77. CICIG 2009, supra note 74 at 65.
78. Hernindez, supra note 76; Ximena Enriquez, Los 7 pecados capitales de las
comisiones depostulaci6n [The 7 deadly sins of the Nominating Commissions], CONTRAPODER
(January 26, 2015), http://contrapoder.com.gt/2015/01/26/los-7-pecados-capitales-de-las-
comisiones-de-postulacion/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
79. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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an effective way to manipulate selection processes.
Even though the qualification of a candidate is not dispositive
for his or her inclusion on a CdP's shortlist, the inclusion of those
with the highest qualifications does give the process a veneer of
legitimacy. And because the voting for the CdP shortlist occurs in
descending order,so in practice, it might be somewhat easier to push
for the inclusion of the higher ranked candidates.
In the 2014 judicial selection processes in Guatemala, the
clearest examples of such practices occurred in the CdPs for the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals." While these CdPs
complied formally with the applicable norms, a closer examination
of the selection processes makes clear that the purpose of these
norms was not respected. Qualification tables did not evaluate
applicants' merits or integrity, norms of transparency were not
complied with, and there were indications of influence peddling
between members of the CdPs and candidates.
a. Qualification Instruments Did Not Evaluate Capacity or
Integrity of Candidates
The CdPs for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals both
established qualification tables that, instead of evaluating the
capacity of candidates, merely valued their professional seniority.
The tables did not contemplate reviewing judicial decisions or other
documents written by candidates, conducting interviews, or
evaluating candidates' integrity.
Several constitutional challenges were made against these
grading tables82 and new processes were designed." However, the
80. Ley de Comisiones de Postulaci6n [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto 19-
2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009 (Guat.), arts. 22, 23.
81. For a description of how this occurred in the selection process of the Attorney
General, see MIRTE POSTEMA, DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOUNDATION, THE SELECTION PROCESS
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN GUATEMALA: INCREASED REGULATION DOES NOT MEAN LESS
ARBITRARINESS (2014), http://dplf.org/sites/default/files/selection processag_in-guatemal
a increasedjregulation does not mean less arbitrariness.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
82. This resulted in the grading tables being temporarily suspended by court order.
Claudia Palma, Comisi6n de Postulaci6n debera repetir tabla de gradaci6n [CdP will need
to redo grading table], PRENSA LIBRE (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.prensalibre.com
/postuladora salade apelaciones/salas de_apelaciones-juzgado quinto-civil-tabla-deg ra
dacion-convergencia-por_1osderechoshumanos_0_1189681183.html) (last visited Sept.
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new tables did not differ substantially from the original versions. 84
They continued to be centered on valuing professional seniority
rather than excellence.85 Moreover, the grading table for the Court of
Appeals was structured in a way that created a significant - and
illogical - disadvantage for career judges. The points that candidates
could receive for professional experience were divided between
"experience in the judiciary," and "experience as a lawyer."86 Since
14, 2015).; Carmen Quintela, Tabla de gradacidn para postuladora CSJ tambign queda
anulada [Grading table for CdP Supreme Court is also anulled], EL PERIODICO (Aug. 12,
2014), http://bdc.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20140812/pais/235/Tabla-de-gradaci6n-de-postulado
ra-para-CSJ-tambi6n-queda-anulada.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
83. However, both CdPs appealed the provisional judgments, and requested further
clarification (aclaracidn) and elaboration (ampliaci6n). Moreover, the CdP for the Supreme
Court requested that one of the lawyers who filed the challenges, as well as the judges who
had ordered the suspension, be submitted to disciplinary proceedings. MOVIMIENTO PRO
JUSTICIA, MONITOREO DE LAS SESIONES DE LAS COMISIONES DE POSTULACION DE
CANDIDATOS A MAGISTRADOS EN EL MES DE AGOSTo (2014) [MONrrORING OF THE SESSIONS OF
THE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS FOR CANDIDATES FOR JUDGES IN THE MONTH OF AUGUST 2014]
[hereinafter MPJ MONITOREO AGOSTO 20141, 36, 37, 40, http://www.movimientopro
justicia.org.gt/images/archivos%202014/otros/Sesiones%20CSJ %20Agosto%202014.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2015).
84. Although the second versions of the tables did formally contemplate the evaluation
of candidates' integrity and honorability, the CdPs never established how this evaluation
would be performed. See MPJ Monitoreo agosto 2014, supra note 83, at 36, 37, 40. First
versions of tables on file with author.
85. Candidates for the Supreme Court could receive a maximum of 70 (out of 100)
points for professional experience: Fifty points if they had served three complete terms as
appeals court judges and/or been a lawyer - working in any law-related field - for more than
twenty years; forty-five points for having completed two periods as an appeals court judge
and/or having fifteen to twenty years of experience as a lawyer; and those who had
completed one period as an appeals court judge and/or had ten to fifteen years of experience
as a lawyer received thirty-five points. Having had a leadership position in either the public
or private sector for a minimum of five years counted for an additional ten points. Comisi6n
de Postulaci6n para Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [CdP for Supreme Court
Justices], Tabla de gradaci6n [Grading table], http://guatemalavisible.net/index.php?option
=comk2&view-item&task=download&id=359_e I 985c66e65027ae73c95cc6813b2eef&Ite
mid=124 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
86. Candidates for the Court of Appeals could receive a maximum of seventy-five (out
of 100) points for professional experience: thirty for their length of experience in the
judiciary, thirty for their length of experience as a lawyer, and fifteen for experience (of more
than five years) in public or private sector positions. Those who had more than fifteen years of
experience in the judiciary received thirty points; those with ten to fifteen years of experience,
twenty-five points; and those with five to ten years of experience, twenty points. Additionally,
candidates with more than fifteen years of experience as a lawyer received thrity points; those
with ten to fifteen years of experience, twenty-five points; and those with five to ten years of
experience received twenty points. Comisi6n de Postulaci6n de la Corte de Apelaciones y
otros Tribunales Colegiados de igual categoria [CdP for the Court of Appeals and other
Collegiate Tribunals of equal hierarchy], Tabla de gradaci6n. Para evaluar aspirantes al
cargo de Magistrado de Corte de Apelaciones y otros Tribunales Colegiados de igual
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career judges (who are common in civil law systems, where judges
tend to spend their entire career in the judiciary) are prohibited from
working as lawyers, they could only receive points in one category-
experience in the judiciary-as opposed to those who had been
active as a lawyer and joined the judiciary later in their careers.87
The inadequacy of the grading tables was evident when twenty-
eight candidates who had applied for both courts received a
significantly higher qualification for a position in the Supreme Court
than for the Court of Appeals. Some received 'only' four points
more, but there were four candidates who were rated twenty-two to
twenty-four points higher in aptitude for the Supreme Court than for
the Court of Appeals. This outcome defies all logic.88 Even though
several members of the CdP admitted that the qualification
instruments had fallen short of conducting solid and just evaluations,
no action was taken to correct this. 89
b. No Examination of Candidates' Merits
These serious shortcomings in the grading tables made it easier
for the CdPs to reach arbitrary decisions. Even though both the
LCP90 and case law from the Constitutional Court established91 that
categoria [Grading table. To evaluate applicants for the position of Judge of the Court of
Appeals and other Collegiate Tribunals of equal hierarchy],http://guatemalavisible.net/
index.php?option=comk2&view-item&task=download&id=367_b68777507074249cdecea7
419e67720b&Itemid=124 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
87. See Postema, Guatemala's Judicial Selection, supra note 46 and DUE PROCESS OF
LAW FOUNDATION, AMIcus CURIAE PRESENTADO ANTE HONORABLE CORTE DE
CONSTITUCIONALIDAD (2014), http://dplf org/sites/default/files/amicus dplf paracc guat
emala~procesos deseleccion-judicial novl4_1.pdf, [hereinafter DPLF AMIcus CURIAE]
(last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
88. These comparisons were made on the basis of the aspects that the grading tables had
in common, without taking into account the additional points candidates for the Supreme
Court received for a psychometric test. If the points for that test would be added, the
difference in qualifications would be 28, 30, 31 and 31 points, respectively. See DPLF
AMICUS CURIAE, supra note 87, at 20-22.
89. See Claudia Palma and Manuel Hemndez, Postulantes no superan pruebas
[Applicants do not pass tests], PRENSA LIBRE (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.prensalibre.com/
postuladora salade-apelaciones/Nacionales-postulantes-no-superan-pruebas-postuladora-s
alas-Apelaciones-pruebas_0_1210678921.html.
90. Ley de Comisiones de Postulaci6n [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto 19-
2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009 (Guat.), arts. 18, 19, 21.
91. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], June 13, 2014, Expediente
Niimero 2143-2014 [File Number 2143-2014] (Guat.).
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CdPs were required to perform an investigation into candidates'
aptitude and conduct interviews, neither commission performed
investigations seriously.9 2
The LCP authorized CdPs to break up into commissions of three
people9 3 allowing for up to eleven simultaneous interviews. Still, the
CdP for the Court of Appeals, citing time constraints, did not hold
any interviews. 94 The CdP for the Supreme Court did hold interviews,
but these were only between two and five minutes in length, in which
each candidate answered one question picked at random.95 Although
this latter CdP might have, again, formally complied with the CC's
requirement to interview candidates, it is clear that the way interviews
were conducted did not allow for a serious evaluation of candidates'
aptitude or integrity, thus failing to comply with applicable norms.
There was a similar disregard in how the CdPs considered
objections made by the public. Although both CdPs formally provided
this possibility in case of concerns about the professional or ethical
qualifications of candidates, the criteria for the evaluation and
verification of information were vague. As a result, it remains unclear
why some complaints were dismissed prima facie and why all others
were eventually declared unfounded. 96
Some candidates of doubtful integrity thus remained in the
process. For example, there was a complaint about the integrity of a
92. See Postema, Guatemala's Judicial Selection, supra note 44; DPLF AMIcus
CURIAE, supra note 87.
93. Ley de Comisiones de Postulaci6n [Nominating Commissions Law], Decreto 19-
2009 [Decree 19-2009] June 2, 2009 (Guat.), art. 19.
94. Carmen Quintela, "Segdn la ley tienen derecho de participar, otra cosa son los
valores" ["According to the law they have a right to participate, values are a different
matter"], EL PERI6DICO (Sept. 5, 2014), http://bdc.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20140905/pais
/1434/Segdn-la-ley-tienen--derecho-de-participar-otra-cosa-son-los-valores".htm.
95. Carmen Quintela, Postuladora entrevista a 105 aspirantes a CS [CdP interviews 105
candidates for Supreme Court], EL PERIODICO (Sept. 18, 2014), http://bdc.elperiodico.co
m.gt/es/20140918/pais/2043/Postuladora-entrevista--a-105-aspirantes-a-CSJ.htm. An example
of one such question was ",Qu6 piensa del nepotismo?" ["What do you think about
nepotism?"], MOVIMIENTO PRO JUSTICIA, SESIONES DE SEPTIEMBRE 2014 DE LA COMISION DE
POSTULACION DE CANDIDATOS A MAGISTRADOS DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA
[SEPTEMBER 2014 SESSIONS OF THE NOMINATING COMISSION FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES]
(hereinafter MPJ MONITOREO SEPTIEMBRE 2014) 67, http://www.movimientoprojusticia.org
.gt/images/archivos%202014/otros/Sesiones%20CSJ%20%20Septiembre%202014.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2015).
96. Id.
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judge who had also been publicly denounced by CICIG for his
suspected involvement in corruption. 97 This judge had been
photographed having lunch with a mayor who had a pending trial for
corruption before that judge's court - a case that the judge soon
dismissed after the lunch meeting.98 Inexplicably, the CdP ruled this
complaint to be unfounded because the accusation relied exclusively
on news clippings. 9 9
Another example of a serious deficiency involved at least two
candidates for the Court of Appeals who were awarded more points
than would have corresponded according to the grading table. One
candidate worked as a public defender for a little less than four years,
then as a private lawyer for nine, and then as a legal advisor for a
public institution for three years. This person received fifty-five
points for professional merits, but according to the grading table, he
should have received thirty points at best.100
c. Transparency Requirements Disregarded
In addition to these considerable substantive shortcomings, the
CdPs failed to comply with norms on transparency: information was
not published timely,' 0 one meeting was closed to the press and the
97. On July 6, 2015, CICIG and the Public Ministry requested that this mayor's
immunity be lifted so he could be indicted for corruption. See Press Release, International
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), Comunicado de prensa 035.
Antejuicios contra cuatro diputados y alcalde de Chinautla [Press release 035. Pre-trial
proceedings against four members of Congress and mayor of Chinautla] (July 6, 2015),
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact-News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=612&cntnt0
Ireturnid=67 (last visited Sept. 14, 2015); see also Manuel Rodriguez, MP espera solicitud
de antejuicio para jueces [Public Ministry awaits request for pre-trial proceedings against
judges], LA HORA (Sept. 17, 2014) http://lahora.gt/mp-espera-solicitud-de-antejuicio-para-
jueces/.
98. Por debajo de la mesa [Under the table], EL PERI6DICO (Guatemala), May 21,
2014, at 1.
99. See MPJ MONITOREO SEPTIEMBRE 2014, supra note 95, at 31.
100. Since the grading table did not contemplate awarding points to candidates with less
than five years of experience in the judiciary, the four years that the candidate worked as a
public defender should remain without credit. Having experience as a lawyer for a period of
five to ten years should count for twenty points, and having experience in the public or
private sector of up to five years would award ten points. DPLF AMIcus CuRIAE, supra note
86, at 19, 20.
101. See Enriquez, supra note 77.
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public,102 and during other meetings, commissioners could only be
observed at a distance and their discussions could not be followed nor
recorded. For instance, during the protracted voting process in both
CdPs, commissioners took frequent, extended recesses to negotiate
privately.1 0 3 Moreover, neither CdP complied with the Constitutional
Court's requirement to "publicly and expressly explain"1 04 the
reasons why a candidate had, or had not, been included in the
shortlist.'s
d. Influence Peddling
Lastly, strong suspicions regarding the influence peddling
between commissioners and candidates surfaced, further disqualifying
the activities of the CdPs. Twenty-three people who participated as
evaluators in one CdP (for example, for Supreme Court judges),
applied to a position in the other CdP (for the Court of Appeals).1 6
This provided them with an unfair advantage. They were able to
lobby the deans of law schools that participated in both commissions
and were also in a position to trade votes with other commissioners
who were candidates. This position of advantage was clear when
eleven applicants who were commissioners in the CdP for the
Supreme Court did not only receive judgeships in the Court of
Appeals, but were also appointed as presidents of their chambers by
the Supreme Court they had helped elect.107
102. Glenda SAnchez, Empieza a opacarse labor de comisiones [Commissions' work is
starting to become intransparent], SIGLo 21 (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.s21.com.gt/ naciona
les/2014/08/06/empieza-opacarse-labor-comisiones.
103.See Claudia Palma, Dura elecci6n de aspirantes a CSJ [Difficult election of applicants for
Supreme Court], PRENSA LIBRE (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.prensalibre.com/p
ostuladora.csj/dura-eleccion-aspirantes-csj_01216678333.html; MPJ MONITOREO
SEPTIEMBRE 2014, supra note 95, at 31.
104. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], June 13, 2014, Expediente
Nfumero 2143-2014 (Guat.).
105. See Postema, Guatemala's Judicial Selection, supra note 46; DPLF AMIcus
CURIAE, supra note 87, at 26, 27.
106. Claudia Palma, Comisionados van tras magistraturas [Commissioners go after
judgeships], PRENSA LIBRE (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.prensalibre.com/postuladora-csj
/Nacionales-comisionados-van-tras-magistraturas-CSJ-Apelaciones-procesospostulacion 0_11
89081086.html.
107. See Glenda Sanchez, Excomisionados ocupan presidencias de salas [Ex-
commissioners take up presidencies of appeals courts], SIGLo 21 (Nov. 28, 2014),
2016] 257
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1. Judiciary and Congress Participated in Violation ofNorms
It is important to note that not just the CdPs were involved in the
manipulation of the selection processes. The judiciary also played an
important role by endorsing the violations committed, thus providing
a veneer of legitimacy. This was done by denying amparos1 0 8
(constitutional challenges), as well as by depriving the few amparos
that were awarded from having practical effects. Congress, in turn,
appointed the justices by means of a fast-track procedure in which no
considerations were given to candidates' qualifications.
The numerous violations committed during the selection
processes led to the presentation of a considerable number of amparos,
which concerned almost every aspect of the proceedings: the profile
and grading tables designed by the CdPs, traffic of interests between
members of the CdPs, and the CdPs' refusal to conduct serious
interviews with candidates. 109 However, almost all such challenges
were dismissed. The reasons for these judicial decisions remain
unclear, given that amparos tend to be granted or denied with the sole
justification that "the circumstances of the case"" 0 advise such
decision.
While several amparos were provisionally granted, their practical
impact was limited. Firstly, because the CC eventually revoked some
of these amparos, it canceled their effect."' Secondly, because a
number of other cases had not yet been resolved at the time the CdPs
http://www.s2l.com.gt/nacionales/2014/11/28/excomisionados-ocupan-presidencias-salas.
108. An amparo action aims to prevent or remedy a violation of constitutional rights. Ley
de Amparo, Exhibici6n Personal y de Constitucionalidad [Amparo, Habeas Corpus and
Constitutionality Law], Decreto 1-86 [Decree 1-86], Jan. 8, 1986 (Guat.).
109. See Press Release, International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
(CICIG), Comunicado de prensa 032. Preocupaci6n sobre procesos de selecci6n de
candidatos para Corte de Apelaciones y Corte Suprema de Justicia [Press release 032.
Concern about selection processes for candidates for the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court of Justice] (hereinafter CICIG press release 032-2014) (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=560&cntnt
01retumid=67, (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
110. The formula the courts tend to use is "...a su juicio, las circunstancias del caso
hacen aconsejable..." [...according to the Court, the circumstances of the case advise
that...]. E.g., Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Oct. 9, 2014, Expedientes
acumulados 4639-2014, 4645-2014, 4646-2014 y 4647-2014, [Joint files 4639-2014, 4645-
2014, 4646-2014 y 4647-2014] (Guat.).
111. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Sept. 19, 2014, Expediente
4054-2014 [File 4054-2014] (Guat.).
258 [Vol. 39:1
A Case Study of Guatemala's Judicial Selection Process
composed their shortlists, thus allowing the selection processes to
continue amongst considerable legal uncertainty.1 12 Thirdly, even in
cases in which the CC had granted amparos, its resolutions were so
limited that they, in practice, did not remedy the violations committed
by the CdPs.
In these latter cases, the CC decisions established that CdPs
needed to create instruments that respected the parameters laid out in
the Constitution and in CC case law. However, the decisions also
emphasized that the Court did not suspend the original grading
tables." This is an essential, but easily overlooked, detail. If the CC
had suspended the grading tables - as the provisional rulings had - it
is likely that the CdPs would have had to start their work all over
again because the grading table is the first step for the entire
selection process. But because the ruling kept the grading tables
intact without attaching clear consequences to noncompliance, the
highest court effectively endorsed the CdPs' modes of operation.
After these deeply flawed selection processes, the Guatemalan
Congress fast-tracked the appointment of the new Supreme Court.
Without waiting until the period to present challenges to the process
had ended, an alliance between the government party and the main
opposition party appointed the thirteen new justices without discussing
their qualifications. 114 Days later, the judges of the Court of Appeals
were elected."' Congress followed in the footsteps of actors who
violated the norms applicable to the judicial selection processes.
A number of new amparo challenges were presented against
these violations.116 However, although the Constitutional Court
112. See Press Release CICIG 032-2014, supra note 109.
113. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Aug. 22, 2014, Expediente
Ni'mero 3772-2014 [File Number 3772-2014] (Guat.). Corte de Constitucionalidad
[Constitutional Court], Aug. 22, 2014, Expediente Nfimero 3758-2014 [File Number 3758-
2014] (Guat.).
114. See Redacci6n La Hora [Editorial Office La Hora], Diputados eligieron a magistrados
sin respeto a 72 horas de impugnacidn [Members of Congress elected judges without
respecting 72 hours for challenges], LA HoRA (Sept. 25, 2014), http://lahora.gt/diputados-
eligieron-magistrados-sin-respeto-72-horas-de-impugnacion/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
115. Jessica Gramajo & Hugo Alvarado, Alianza Partido Patriota y Lider eligen cortes
de Apelaciones [Alliance between Patriot Party and Lider elects appeals courts], Prensa
Libre (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.prensalibre.com/postuladora-salade-apelaciones/ Nacio
nales-alianza-PP-y-Lider-eligen-cortes-postuladora-Salas-Apelaciones-Congreso_0_122207
7785.html (last visited Oct. 9 , 2015).
116. See B. Visquez, H. Alvarado & J. Ramos, Crece presi6n a CC para revertir
elecciones a magistrados [Pressure mounts for Constitutional Court to revert elections of
2016]1 259
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granted a provisional injunction, suspending the effects of the
selection process and thus preventing the judges-elect from taking
office,117 it eventually endorsed the selection processes."'
2. No Major Social or Political Consequences
Despite this clear disregard for applicable norms, public outrage
was not widespread among the Guatemalan public. This was not
because the violations committed by the CdPs had not been evident;
the selection processes had received ample media coverage. While
the number of articles at the beginning of the CdPs' operations might
have been modest,' 19 there was considerable media attention in the
months of September, October, and November of 2014 with an
average of around 300 newspaper articles per month.1 20
However, a week before the justices-elect were scheduled to
take office, another scandal surfaced. An appeals court judge
announced she would not be taking office because of the violations
committed during the selection processes, and she called upon her
fellow judges to join her in speaking out.121 This judge, Claudia
Escobar, denounced that an influential member of Congress of the
government party had attempted to bribe her. If she would decide an
judges], PRENSA LIBRE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.prensalibre.com/postuladora-Csj/
Nacionales-procesos-postulacion-postuladora-CSJ-Salas-Apelaciones-crece-presion-CC-
para-revertir-elecciones-magistrados_0_1226277365.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
117. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Oct. 9, 2014, Expedientes
Acumulados No. 4639-2014, 4645-2014, 4646-2014, and 4647-2014 [Joint files No. 4639-
2014, 4645-2014, 4646-2014, and 4647-2014] (Guat.).
118. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Nov. 19, 2014, Expediente No.
4639-2014 y Acumulados [File No. No. 4639-2014 and Joint Cases] (Guat.).
119. Some 56 articles were published in July, and some 59 in August. Numbers based on
press compilations made by Centro de Estudios de Guatemala [Center of Studies of
Guatemala] (CEG) of articles published in six nationally circulated newspapers: Prensa
Libre, el Peri6dico, Siglo21, La Hora, Diario de Centroam&rica and Nuestro Diario. At
times, CEG supplemented this coverage with articles published by online medium Plaza
Piblica, as well as radio broadcaster Emisoras Unidas. Compilations on file with author.
120. In September, at least 307 articles were published. October had at least 379 articles
on the topic, and November, saw at least 234 articles. Numbers based on press compilations
made by Centro de Estudios de Guatemala (CEG), on file with author.
121. See Jessica Gramajo, Elecci6n de cortes esta viciada, dice jueza [Election of courts
is flawed, says judge], PRENSA LIBRE (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.prensalibre.com/postulador
a sala-de-apelaciones/Salas deapelaciones-Congreso-elecciones-irregularidades-Guatemala-
CortedeConstitucionalidad-renuncia-jueza-ClaudiaEscobar_0_1225077482.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2015).
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amparo case pending before her court in favor of the then-Vice-
President, she would be reelected as a judge. 12 2 Escobar had recorded
the entire conversation. This evidence was presented to the Supreme
Court in proceedings to authorize further investigation of this
member of Congress.
However, despite this seemingly clear proof, the Supreme Court
declined the request to start proceedings to lift the Congressman's
immunity, 123 and the Public Ministry refused to investigate the case
proprio motu. 124 While Escobar's statements put the selection
processes back in the national debate, the only consequences that
ensued were that reprisals were taken against Escobar and the judges
who had stood with her.1 25 Notwithstanding the clear indications of
manipulation of the selection processes, the Constitutional Court, as
mentioned above, endorsed the proceedings,126 and a completely
renewed Supreme Court and Court of Appeals took office in
November 2014.127
122. The people who visited Escobar were Gudiberto Rivera, former President of
Congress, and Vernon GonzAlez, Vice-President Baldetti's lawyer and a government
appointee. Although Escobar did not vote in favor of the amparo filed by the Vice-President,
Congress reelected her as an appeals court judge anyway.
123. Evelyn De Le6n, CSJ engaveta antejuicio contra diputado oficialista Gudy Rivera
[Supreme Court shelves pre-trial proceedings against Gudy Rivera, Congressman of
government party] (Nov. 14, 2014), Sov502, available at http://www.soy502.com/
articulo/csj-antejuicio-gudy-rivera (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). CICIG filed an amparo
against this decision before the Constitutional Court, and some six months after this petition
was filed, the CC granted the amparo, returning the case to the Supreme Court. It is
important to note that this CC decision was handed down in a thoroughly altered political
climate. Edwin Pitin, CC ampara a CICIG por antejuicio a Gudy Rivera [CC rules in favor
of CICIG on pre-trial proceedings against Gudy Rivera], PRENSA LIBRE (Aug. 5, 2015),
available at http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/justicia/cc-ampara-al-mp-por-antejuicio
-a-gudy-rivera (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
124. Evelyn De Le6n, MP no hard nada para revertirfallo que cerr6 antejuicio a Gudy
Rivera [Public Ministry will not do anything to revert decision that closed pre-trial
proceedings against Gudy Rivera], SoY502 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.soy502.com
/articulo/mp-no-hara-nada-revetir-fallo-cerro-antejuicio-gudy-rivera (last visited Sept. 14,
2015).
125. DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOUNDATION & MYRNA MACK FOUNDATION, INFORME DE
AUDIENCIA. DERECHOs HUMANOS E INDEPENDENCIA JUDICIAL EN GUATEMALA [HEARING
REPORT. HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN GUATEMALA] 33-48 (2015),
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/inf audiencia tindependencia.judiciall9marzo2015
dplffmm.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
126. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Nov. 19, 2014, Expediente No.
4639-2014 y Acumulados [File No. 4639-2014 and Joint files] (Guat.).
127. En medio de pokmica, juramentan a jerarcas judiciales de Guatemala [In middle
of controversy, highest judges of Guatemala are sworn in], EL PERI6DICO (Nov. 24, 2014),
2016] 261
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III. Entrenched Problems Call for Structural Solutions
The violation of applicable norms, such as those that occurred
throughout Guatemala's judicial selection processes, is not limited to
these occasions. A similar disregard for the law has been displayed
where legal reforms curtailed powers of authorities. An example is
the refusal by successive Guatemalan Supreme Courts to respect
certain provisions in the Ley de Carrera Judicial (Law on the
Judicial Career, "LCJ") 1 28 that limit their power over lower judges.
Instead, these Courts have continued to apply provisions from the
Ley del Organismo Judicial (Law on the Judiciary, "LOJ"),12 9 even
though the LCJ is of a more recent date and its provisions should
thus, in case of conflict, take precedence over articles in the LOJ.13 0
Such structural problems continue to thwart meaningful progress in
strengthening the judiciary.
It remains doubtful that this situation will improve. Although the
full impact of the manipulation of the 2014 judicial selection process
on the rule of law might be difficult to determine relatively shortly
after their conclusion, a number of decisions by the newly elected
Supreme Court have been severely criticized for their perceived bias
in favor of those who helped elect the justices. One example is the
Court's appointment of eleven former CdP commissioners (appeals
court judges who established the shortlist for the Supreme Court and
who received judgeships) as presidents of their chambers."' Another
controversial decision was the Court's ruling to not allow pretrial
proceedings to go forward against a member of Congress who is a
key member of the government party that forged a political alliance
http://bdc.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20141124/pais/5302/En-medio-de-pol6mica-juramentan-a-
jerarcas-judiciales-de-Guatemala.htm.
128. Ley de Carrera Judicial [Law on the Judicial Career, Decreto 41-99 [Decree 41-
99], Nov. 29, 1999.
129. Ley de Organismo Judicial [Law on the Judiciary], Decreto 2-89 [Decree 2-89],
Mar. 28, 1989.
130. M6nica Leonardo Segura, Independencia y transparencia del poder judicial en
Guatemala [Independence and transparency of the judiciary in Guatemala], in: DUE
PROCESS OF LAW FOUNDATION, LEY VS. REALIDAD: INDEPENDENCIA Y TRANSPARENCIA DE LA
JUSTICIA EN CENTROAMtRICA Y PANAMA [LAW VS. REALITY: INDEPENDENCE AND
TRANSPARENCY OF THE JUDICIARY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA], 4 (2013),
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/guatemala-v05.pdf.
131. Sdnchez, supra note 107.
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to elect the current Supreme Courtl32 and was caught on tape
pressuring appeals court judge Claudia Escobar. 13 3 Additionally, a
member of the Supreme Court has recently been the subject of
controversy. Blanca Aida Stalling Ddvila and members of her family
have been linked to several high-level corruption cases.1 34
Addressing such entrenched issues, in which so many powerful
actors are involved, requires rigorous measures. However, despite
the magnitude of its problems, Guatemala might also provide a
unique example of how this can be done: by the establishment of an
internationally supported entity tasked with the investigation and
dismantling of parallel criminal powers like CIACS. 135
Following the lack of progress in combating CIACS,
Guatemalan civil society organizations pushed for the establishment
of a UN-backed commission. This commission was fully funded by
international cooperation and was designed to investigate these illegal
actors operating in the country. 136 After the Constitutional Court
invalidated the creation of the initial version of this commission,137
the agreement was renegotiated with the assistance of the United
Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 138  and the
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala started its
operations in 2007.139 This hybrid entity does not have prosecutorial
132. See Gramajo & Alvarado, supra note 115.
133. See section II.B.4 of this Article.
134. Stalling Divila's son was arrested for his involvement in a high-level corruption
crime ring, and her sister in law, a judge, is being investigated for having accepted bribes in
another high-profile corruption case. Both cases were investigated by CICIG. See Claudia
Palacios, Blanca Stalling y sus vinculos son un reto para el sistema de justicia [Blanca
Stalling and her connections are a challenge for the justice system], LA HORA (June 24,
2015), http://lahora.gt/blanca-stalling-y-sus-vinculos-son-un-reto-para-el-sistema-de-justicia/
(last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Carolina Gamazo, Los seis vinculos comprometedores de la
magistrada Blanca Stalling [The six compromising connections of Justice Blanca Stalling],
PLAZA POBLICA (May 11, 2015), http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/los-seis-vinculos-
comprometedores-de-la magistrada-blanca-stalling (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
135. See section I of this Article. The experience of CICIG in Guatemala and the
relevant lessons for other countries will be addressed in more detail in a forthcoming
publication by the author.
136. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA (CICIG),
Background, http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=background (last visited Sept. 14, 2015)
[hereinafter: CICIG BACKGROUND].
137. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Aug. 5, 2004, Opini6n
Consultiva Expediente No. 1250-2004 [Advisory Opinion File No. 1250-2004] (Guat.).
138. CICIG BACKGROUND, supra note 136.
139. Agreement between the United Nations and the State of Guatemala on the
2632016]
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powers because all legal actions need to be initiated by the
Guatemalan Public Ministry. However, it does have the power to
investigate CIACS, participate in criminal proceedings as a third
party, and recommend public policy.140
After eight years of operations that, understandably, have seen
ups and downs, CICIG's work is starting to show considerable
impact in Guatemala. It has helped to establish a legal framework for
the investigation of complex criminal cases, assisted in the creation
of local capacity for such investigations, and participated in public
policy debates, 141 although the Guatemalan Congress has largely
disregarded its proposals for reforms. 142 CICIG's most important
contribution has been the investigation of cases. These investigations
initially concerned less prominent organized crime structures, but
soon started to include high-level authorities.
In CICIG's earlier years, such high-level cases were met with
obstruction within Guatemala, but convictions obtained in foreign
courts1 43 legitimized the Commission's work. In recent years, its
investigations have included influential criminal networks, as well as
current members of Congress, judges, and high-level authorities.
While these more recent investigations might not yet have resulted in
establishment of an International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG),
Dec. 12, 2006, U.N.T.S. 2472.
140. See Id.; INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA ("CICIG"),
Mandate, http://www. cicig.org/index.php?page=mandate (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
141. See WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (WOLA), THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA (CICIG): AN INNOVATIVE INSTRUMENT
AGAINST CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND FOR STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW (2015),
[hereinafter: WOLA CICIG REPORT] http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Citizen
%20Security/2015/WOLACICIGENGFNLextra%20page.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2015).
142. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA (CICIG),
Institutional Reform, http://www. cicig. org/index.php?page=institutional-reform (last visited
Sep. 14, 2015).
143. See WOLA CICIG REPORT, supra note 141; Press Release, United States
Attorney's Office of the Southern District of New York, Former President of Guatemala
Alfonso Portillo Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court for Laundering Millions of Dollars
Through United States Banks (May 22, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-
releases/2014/former-president-of-guatemala-alfonso-portillo-sentenced-in-manhattan-feder
al-court-for-laundering-millions-of-dollars-through-united-states-banks (last visited Sep. 14,
2015); Press Release, International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG),
Press release 021, 5 years and 3 months in prison for retired military officials (June 5,
2014), http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=545&
cntnt0lreturnid =105 (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
144. See WOLA CICIG REPORT, supra note 141.
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convictions, it is undeniable that the revelations regarding the
involvement of high-level public officials in crime rings and schemes
to defraud the State'45 have had an enormous impact in the country.
CICIG's accusations against powerful governmental appointees,
such as the director and former director of Guatemala's customs
authority and former presidents of its Central Bank, forced the
President, the Vice-President, and a number of cabinet ministers to
resign. The public outrage against corruption spurred pacific protests
of a magnitude not seen in decades.146 The former President and
Vice-President, as well as a number of other authorities, have since
been detained for their involvement in one of those corruption
cases. 147
These events are unprecedented, and have already had a
considerable impact in the country. They provide a unique
opportunity to address Guatemala's entrenched problems. However,
it is important to note that their long-term effects will mostly depend
on whether the parallel power structures identified will effectively be
disbanded and whether comprehensive reforms will be implemented
that might lead to meaningful changes in practice.
It seems that CICIG's recent successes also created an important
spillover effect in neighboring countries. Calls for the establishment
of similar commissions in countries facing comparable challenges,
such as Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico, have recently become
louder.14 8 CICIG's experience should be studied in more detail in
145. See Press Release, International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
(CICIG), Comunicado de prensa 055. A prisi6n preventiva ex presidente Otto Pdrez Molina
[Press Release 055. Pretrial detention for former President Otto Fernando P&ez Molina]
(Sep. 8, 2015), http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact-News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt0 1 article
id=632 &cntnt0lreturnid=67 (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
146. See Guatemalan President resigns after arrest warrant issued, THE GUARDIAN (Sep.
3, 2015), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/guatemalan-prosecutors
-move-to-arrest-president-otto-perez-molina (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Thousands of
protesters demand resignation of president in Guatemala, THE GUARDIAN (June 12, 2015),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/12/protesters-guatemala-president-
resignation (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
147. Francisco Goldman, From President to Prison: Otto Pirez Molina and a Day for
Hope in Guatemala, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news
/news-desk/from-president-to-prison-otto-perez-molina-and-a-day-for-hope-in-guatemala.
148. See Michael Lohmuller, InSight Crime, Honduras Protestors Call for Own Version
of Guatemala's CICIG, INSIGHT CRIME (June 9, 2015), http://www.insighterime.org/news-
briefs/honduras-protestors-call-for-creation-of-un-court; Selim Rodriguez, CICIG, veni a El
Salvador [CICIG, come to El Salvador], EL MUNDO (July 28, 2015), http://elmundo.sv/
cicig-veni-a-el-salvador/; Jorge Castafieda, "Cicig en Mdxico: Cicim" ["CICIG in Mexico:
2016] 265
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order to draw relevant lessons for the possible establishment of
comparable entities in other countries.
IV_ Conclusion
Judicial reforms led to the adoption of detailed norms for
judicial selection processes in Guatemala. As a result, the country
counts with a much more elaborate normative framework than other
States in the Americas. However, this Article demonstrated that the
2014 selection processes in Guatemala could nevertheless be
manipulated, and that this occurred with the endorsement of judicial
and political authorities.
A number of important lessons can be drawn from this
experience that might be valuable to other countries. These could be
especially relevant in contexts where efforts to strengthen public
institutions will be undertaken, possibly following periods of
dictatorship or conflict, and in which de facto powers might
constitute an obstacle to the effective implementation of reforms.
First of all, Guatemala's judicial selection processes showed that
reforms focused on the judiciary alone, without addressing (the role
of other actors in) the system of governance, have proved insufficient
to effect meaningful changes in practice. The structural causes of
weaknesses in the judiciary should be analyzed, and these should be
addressed by undertaking comprehensive reforms, of which judicial
reforms form a part.
Secondly, Guatemala's experience suggests that where
entrenched interests of powerful actors interfere in the operation of
(semi-) public institutions, reforms are likely to be unsuccessful if
such manipulations are not combated first.
Thirdly, the recent successes of CICIG in investigating and
dismantling parallel powers in Guatemala show its utility in
combating the interference of such powers in the State. This
experience should be studied in more detail to explore whether
similar internationally supported mechanisms might be useful to
countries facing comparable challenges.
CICIM'", MILENIO (Aug. 17, 2015); http://www.milenio.com/firmas/jorge-castaneda/Ci
cig-Mexico-Cicimj 8 574922522.html.
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